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LOCKWOOD v. SMIGEL: CALIFORNIA'S VERSION
OF THE PART PAYMENT RULE UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
With the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1965,
California significantly modified its statute of frauds for the sale of
goods. The enactment of Commercial Code section 22011 brought
California in line with the modem theory that the statute of frauds
should not always be utilized to prevent enforcement of otherwise valid
agreements just because the contract is oral.2 To implement this the-
ory the code provides not only that certain minimum writing require-
ments will satisfy the statute but also provides-as an exception to the
writing requirements-that certain actions by the parties may validate
an otherwise unenforceable oral contract.' One of the major excep-
tions to the writing requirement is the part payment rule under which
a buyer may take the contract out of the statute of frauds by paying
part of the purchase price. The code section provides:
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements [of a
writing] but which is valid in other respects is enforceable ....
(c) With respect to goods for which payment has been made
and accepted. .... 4
Under the common law part payment rule, a party could enforce
an oral contract for the total quantity of goods proven to be the sub-
ject of the contract.5  Under this section-which exists in all jurisdic-
1. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 819, § 2201, at 1860. Section 2-201 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC) became effective in California on January 1, 1965. Cal-
ifornia adopted the 1962 official text of the American Law Institute's Uniform Com-
mercial Code, with several amendments not here in point.
2. See Sixth Progress Report to the Legislature by the Senate Fact Finding
Committee on Judiciary, Analysis and Interim Report of the State Bar of California
(1959-1961), Part I, the Uniform Commercial Code 316, 339 in 1 APPENDIX TO
THE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE (1961). See also A Special Report by the California
State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, 37 CAL. ST. BJ. 119, 141 (1962).
3. Section 2201 of the California Commercial Code sets out the requirements
that must be met by a written contract to satisfy the statute and also provides for
several exceptions to the writing requirement: (1) between merchants a written con-
firmation of an oral agreement, if received by the party to be charged, may be en-
forceable as a writing if written objection is not given within 10 days; (2) specially
manufactured goods may estop a party from asserting the defense of the statute; and
(3) goods which have been received and accepted by the buyer are exempt from the
Statute of Frauds, CAL. CoMM. CODE §§ 2201(2) to (3) (West 1964).
4. Id. § 2201(3)(c).
5. See REsTATEmENT OF CONTRACrs §§ 178(1), 205 (1932). Section 178(1)
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tions that have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code provisions'-
the contract is enforceable only with respect to the specific goods for
which payment has been received by the seller rather than for the total
quantity of goods involved in the contract. A problem of judicial in-
terpretation is created by this change because the code section does
not distinguish between divisible and indivisible contracts. While an
apportionment under this code section can easily be applied by courts
to divisible contracts, the section cannot be literally applied when a
buyer tenders and the seller accepts a part payment for an indivisible
item.7
The inherent ambiguity of these provisions has resulted in vary-
ing judicial interpretations of the effect of the code section on oral
agreements in which the buyer has made a part payment for an in-
divisible unit.8 Under one interpretation, if part payment cannot be
apportioned to any particular unit, then the part payment is viewed
as an independent fact which does not validate the alleged oral agree-
ment.0 Under a more liberal view, a part payment for one commer-
cial unit is sufficient evidence that a contract existed between the par-
ties, and the court will enforce the oral agreement.1"
provides in part: "The following classes of informal contracts are by statute unen-
forceable unless there is a written memorandum thereof signed by the party against
whom enforcement of the contract is sought, or by some person thereunto authorized
by him: . . . Class VI. Contracts for the sale of goods or choses in action of a
value above an amount variously fixed by the statutes of the several States, unless the
buyer accepts and actually receives what is sold or part thereof, or gives something in
earnest or in partial or entire payment of the price." California adopted five hun-
dred dollars as the value above which the statute of frauds would apply. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1624a (West 1954) (repealed, Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 819, § 5, at 1998).
6. For a collection of the statutory versions of the UCC for other jurisdictions
see 1 P-H CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT-INSTALLMENT SALES V 17,501 (1971).
The code has been adopted by all states except Louisiana.
7. For discussions concerning the problem created by the failure of the UCC
section to differentiate between goods which are readily apportionable and indivisible
unit contracts compare Project: A Comparison of California Sales Law and Article
Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1087, 1104-05 (1963)
with Corman, The Law of Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 RUTGERS
L. REV. 14, 22-23 (1962). Corman's view is that the entire part payment appor-
tionment rule of the UCC is unnecessary and that the common law rule should still
be employed.
8. The failure of UCC § 2-201(3)(c) to distinguish between divisible and
indivisible contracts was commented upon by Professor Williston in his criticism of
the code prior to its adoption by any state. See Williston, The Law of Sales in the
Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 575 (1950).
9. Williamson v. Martz, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 33 (C.P. Northumberland County
1956) (discussed in text accompanying notes 45-48 infra).
10. Starr v. Freeport Dodge, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 271, 282 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Dist. Ct.
1967) (discussed in text accompanying notes 49-57 infra).
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In a recent California case, Lockwood v. Smigel," the Court of
Appeal for the Second District was faced with the proper interpreta-
tion of the code section in a case involving an oral agreement for the
sale of an automobile in which the purchaser had made a down pay-
ment at the time of the sale. The court held that since the quantity
terms of the alleged agreement were not in dispute because only one
automobile was involved, the oral sales agreement would be enforced
on the basis of the part payment. Thus, the oral agreement for the
sale of the automobile was deemed enforceable by proof that the buyer
had tendered, and the seller had accepted, part payment. 2
This note will discuss three different judicial interpretations of
the Uniform Commercial Code provisions pertaining to the enforce-
ability of an oral agreement for the sale of goods for which the buyer
had made a part payment. The California statute of frauds prior to
the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code will be briefly discussed
in order to provide a context within which to discuss the merits of
the decision in Lockwood and to evaluate other interpretations which
have been given the code provision in terms of public policy considera-
tions inherent in a modem statute of frauds.
The California Part Payment Rule-Past and Present
In holding that a part payment validated an oral agreement for
the sale of an indivisible item, the California court in Lockwood relied
heavily on prior California law. Therefore, a brief review of the history
of the part payment rule as developed under the California statute of
frauds is in order.
The very first session of the California legislature adopted "An
Act Concerning Fraudulent Conveyances and Contracts", which con-
tained California's original statute of frauds. 3 This statute required a
11. 18 Cal. App. 3d 800, 96 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1971).
12. Id. at 804, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
13. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 114, § 13, at 266 (repealed 1955). This statute was
derived from the New York statute of frauds. N.Y. Cirv. CODE § 865 (Field Draft
1865). The Field Code's version of the statute of frauds was in turn founded on the
original English statute enacted in 1677, which had sought to prevent enforcement of
certain oral contracts, because of the fear that undocumented agreements could be
fraudulently conceived and enforced. It provided in pertinent part: "And be it
further enacted . . . that. . . no contract for the sale of any goods, wares and mer-
chandizes, for the price of ten pounds sterling or upwards, shall be allowed to be good,
except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold, and actually receive the same,
or give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or in part of payment, or that some
note or memorandum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by the parties
to be charged by such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized." 29 Car.
II, Cap. 3, § 17 (1676), quoted in F. BOLLES, A COLLECTION OF ImPORTANT ENGLISH
STATuTES 97-98 (2d ed. 1888), For a more complete discussion of the original Eng-
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writing to evidence an agreement for the sale of goods with a certain
minimum value before allowing enforcement of such agreement.
However, even at this time, certain exceptions to the requirements
of a written memorandum of the agreement were embodied in the
statutes. One such exception provided in part:
Every contract for the sale of any goods . . . for the price of
two hundred dollars or over, shall be void, unless . . . the buyer
shall at the time pay some part of the purchase money."
Known as the "part payment exception," this section was justified on
the theory that the overt act of the parties in tendering and accepting
part payment for the goods evidenced the existence of a contract so
that the writing requirement was unnecessary as a protection against
fraud. 15 The tendering and acceptance of money was deemed to
constitute partial performance of the contract and was thus sufficient
to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds." The part pay-
ment exception was preserved when California adopted the Uniform
Sales Act."7
Even though the underlying rationale for the part payment excep-
tion was that the part payment provided the evidentiary foundation for
enforcing the oral agreement,18 the courts did not restrict enforce-
ment of the agreement to an aliquot part of the quantity term. For
example, a contract for many commercial units was fully enforceable
even though the payment did not equal the price of even one of the
lish Statute of Frauds see 2 A. CORBIN, Contracts §§ 275, 467 (1950) [hereinafter cited
as CORBIN].
14. Cal. Stat. 1850, ch. 114, § 13, at 266 (repealed 1955).
15. "The legislature . . . meant only to require some objective evidential factor
... that a court or jury may reasonably allow to turn the scale when oral testimony
is in conflict." 2 CORBIN, supra note 13, § 494.
16. See id. § 467.
17. The part payment rule was preserved through reenactment of the 1850 statute
in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1739 (Deering 1931) (repealed, Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 819, § 2 at
1997). California's legislature also adopted another provision that preserved the com-
mon law part payment rule. Id. § 1624a (West 1954) provided in part: "(1) A con-
tract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred
dollars or upward shall not be enforceable by action unless the buyer shall accept part
of the goods or choses in action so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive
the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment, or
unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the
party to be charged or his agent in that behalf." This section was derived from sec-
tion (4)(1) of the Uniform Sales Act. It was repealed by Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 819,
§ 5, at 1998. The Restatement of Contracts also adopted this construction of the
part payment rule. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 178(1), 205 (1932). Tenta-
tive drafts of the Second Restatement have deleted the sections on the statute of frauds
since they have been incorporated in the UCC.
18. See 2 CORBIN, supra note 13, § 494.
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items.' 9
The part payment exception was substantially changed with the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in California. The pres-
ent California part payment rule is incorporated in section 2201 of the
California Commercial Code and provides that an oral agreement which
is otherwise valid, is enforceable only "[w]ith respect to goods for
which payment has been made and accepted ... ."o Under this pro-
vision the oral agreement is enforceable only for that quantity of goods
to which the part payment can be apportioned.2 Of course, the ra-
ionale for this limitation is that part payment alone does not establish
the oral contract's quantity term.22
For example, consider the following hypothetical fact situation:
Suppose B, an automobile dealer, has ordered cars in the past from
the regional wholesaler, S, and that the number of autos ordered by B
at any one time has varied from a single car to a number of cars. On a
particular occasion, B orders one automobile from S over the telephone
and sends a check for the automobile to S. The next day the market
for automobiles changes drastically, and B knows that S will not accept
further orders subsequent to that date. Shortly thereafter S delivers
the one automobile in accordance with the oral agreement, but B
fraudulently claims the oral agreement was for twenty-five cars, and de-
mands that S deliver the balance due under the agreement. When S
fails to comply with this demand, B sues S for breach of contract.
Under the California common law statute, the receipt and accept-
ance of the part payment by S-payment for the one automobile-
would have satisfied the requirements for enforcing the oral agree-
ment and would have entitled B to receive as many automobiles from
S as he could prove to the satisfaction of the jury were the subject mat-
ter of the oral agreement.2" Under this rule,4 the seller was left in the
19. See, e.g., Warfield v. Basso, 62 Cal. App. 47, 216 P. 48 (1923); King v.
Globe Grain & Milling Co., 58 Cal. App. 105, 208 P. 166 (1922); Alciatti v. Origlia,
49 Cal. App. 756, 194 P. 740 (1920).
20. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2201(3) (c) (West 1964). This section was derived
without change from UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(3) (c).
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 2 provides that partial
payment as a substitute for the required memorandum can validate the contract only
for the goods which have been accepted or for which payment has been made and
accepted.
22. id. § 2-201(3)(c) validates an oral contract for multiple commercial units
only to the extent that the part payment can be apportioned by the court. For a dis-
cussion of the problem created under the former statutes see 1 W. HAwKLAND, A
TRANSACTIONAL GumE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCAL CODE 27-29 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as HAWKLAND].
23. Cf. Sloan v. Hiatt, 245 Cal. App. 2d 926, 54 Cal. Rptr. 351 (1966).
24. See note 17 supra.
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position of having to defend on the factual issue of quantity included
in the terms of the alleged oral agreement. In commercial markets,
where prices and demand fluctuate rapidly, a great injustice could and
often did result to sellers or buyers when the party, on the basis of a
small payment, could assert an oral agreement for whatever quantity he
wished.2"
California's present Commerdial Code section 2201(3)(c) at-
tempts to correct this injustice by providing that part payment satis-
fies the statute of frauds only "[w]ith respect to goods for which pay-
ment has been made and accepted . *.".., Under this mechanical
rule, S, in our hypothetical example, would not be exposed to the risk
of an adverse finding of fact on the quantity term of the contract be-
cause B would be allowed to enforce the oral agreement for only one
automobile, since the payment by B exactly equalled one commercial
unit.
Lockwood v. Smigel
In the hypothetical case discussed above, we noted that when
buyer and seller entered into an oral contract for the sale of several
automobiles, and the buyer tendered a part payment equal to one au-
tomobile, the California courts would enforce the agreement to the ex-
tent of one automobile. This result stems from a literal reading of
Commercial Code section 2201(3)(c). Now consider a different fact
situation. Suppose buyer and seller enter into an oral agreement for
the sale of one automobile-an indivisible commercial unit. The
buyer then tenders and the seller accepts a down payment which does
not equal the total sales price. Subsequent to this transaction, the seller
repudiates the oral agreement, and the buyer sues the seller for breach
of contract. The court cannot literally apply section 2201(3)(c) to
these facts since the down payment and the price of a commercial
unit are unequal.
In Lockwood v. Smigel27 the Second District Court of Appeal was
confronted by just such a fact situation. In Lockwood the seller had
orally offered to sell his 1967 Silver Shadow Rolls Royce for $11,400.
The buyer had accepted the offer and paid $100 as a part payment.
Subsequent to this oral agreement, the seller refused delivery and noti-
fied the buyer that he had sold the vehicle to a third party. The buyer
25. Professor Hawkland noted in his treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code
that the former part payment rule allowed a party to an oral contract to attempt to
enforce a contract for a fraudulent quantity term based on a small part payment; this
left the other party in the difficult position of having to defend on the factual question
of quantity. 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 22, at 28.
26. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2201(3)(c) (West 1964).
27. 18 Cal. App. 3d 800, 96 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1971).
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sued the defaulting seller for breach of contract. The seller demurred
to the complaint, setting up Commercial Code section 2201 as his sole
defense.28  The municipal court sustained the demurrer.29  On appeal
to the appellate department of the superior court, the case was certified
to the court of appea 30 to determine "whether under Commercial
Code section 2201, subdivision (3)(c), an oral contract for the sale
of an automobile is made enforceable by reason of a part payment. 31
The primary issue, as viewed by the court of appeal, was one of
statutory construction of an ambiguous section of the commercial code;
however, the court ultimately based the decision on prior California
law32 because the code provided no solution. At the outset, the court
of appeal noted that the oral contract, as pleaded, would have been en-
forceable under prior California law because of the part payment.1
3
Presiding Justice Files proceeded to consider the extent to which the
California Commercial Code section had superseded the California com-
mon law34 and noted that the text of Uniform Commercial Code sec-
tion 2-201(3)(c) and the related comments fail to distinguish be-
tween divisible and indivisible contracts. 35 Also, there were appar-
28. CAL. COMM. CODE § 2201 (West 1964) provides: "(1) Except as otherwise
provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more
is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A
writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon
but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods
shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of
the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subdivision (1) against such
party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10 days after
it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subdivision (1) but
which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) If the goods are to be specifically manufactured for the buyer and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller,
before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably
indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of
their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or
(c) With respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or
which have been received and accepted (Section 2606)."
29. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
30. CAL. C . & ChUM. RuLEs (Civ.) 63 (West Supp. 1971).
31. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 801, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
32. See the discussion of California's Statute of Frauds for the sale of goods
prior to the adoption of the UCC in the text accompanying notes 13-25 supra.
33. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
34. See text accompanying notes 13-25 supra.
35. Professor Williston had pointed this out in his criticism of the Uniform
February 1972] UCC'S PART PAYMENT RULE
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ently no appellate court decisions construing this code section to which
the court could refer. Two cases from lower courts, Williamson v.
Martz and Starr v. Freeport Dodge, Inc., discussed subsequently in this
note, were acknowledged 36 by the court, however, neither were deemed
persuasive.
The court, therefore, began with a consideration of the policy un-
derlying the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code's statute of
frauds. The court noted that
[t]he purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent the enforcement
of alleged promises that never were made; it is not . . . to justify
contractors in repudiating promises that were in fact made.37
The court also emphasized the liberalized criteria for taking an oral
contract out of the statute, noting that the California Commercial Code
requires only that the memorandum evidence a contract, be signed,
and state a quantity.38
Having thus set the stage, the court stated that section 2201(3)(c)
of the California Commercial Code is an exception to the liberal trend
favoring enforcement of oral agreements and was primarily designed
to avoid disputes over quantity terms of oral agreements.39 The court
noted that since the contract was only alleged to be for one commercial
unit there was no real dispute over quantity. Therefore, reasoned the
court, part payment for the automobile evidenced the existence of a
bargain as satisfactorily as would a written memorandum of agree-
ment.4" The court concluded that the "policies of the law are well
served" by the enforcement of the contract for the sale of the Rolls
Royce.4' Because the contract was for only one commercial unit, the
court held that the apportionment problem to which section 2201(3)(c)
was addressed did not arise and therefore the section did not apply.
The court found preferable the application of the statutory policy un-
der the California common law statute of frauds. 2  The decision of
Commercial Code. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 575-76 (1950). See also 1 NEw YORK LAw REVISION
COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 371 (1955).
36. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 803 n.4, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 290 n.4.
37. Id. at 803, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291, quoting Corbin, The Uniform Commercial
Code-Sales: Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 829 (1950). Corbin and
Williston had conflicting views on the merits of the UCC. Corbin was an advocate of
the code, while Williston criticized it.
38. Id. at 803, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291. See CAL. COMM. CODE § 2201(1) (West
1964).
39. See 1 HAWKLAND, supra note 22, at 27-29. See also CAL. COMM. CODE
§ 2201(3)(c), Comments (West 1964); 1 CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL LAW 324 (Cont.
Educ. Bar ed., 1966).
40. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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the lower court was reversed with directions to overrule the demurrer
to the complaint.
The Part Payment Rule-Other Jurisdictions
Two other cases have considered the problems created by Uni-
form Commercial Code section 2-201(3)(c). A Pennsylvania dis-
trict court has interpreted this section to preclude the enforcement of
such a contract because the language of the code section does not spe-
cifically cover this contingency. 43 On the other hand, a New York dis-
trict court has enforced a contract for an indivisible item based on a
part payment.44
Pennsylvania's Restrictive Approach
In Williamson v. Martz" the Pennsylvania court held that section
2-201(3)(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code precluded enforce-
ment of an oral contract for the purchase of two milk vats where a
part payment was insufficient to pay for even one of the milk vats.
The purchase price for the two vats was $1,600, and the defendant had
paid $100 on account at the time the verbal agreement was made.
The defendant-buyer refused to carry out the oral agreement. When
the seller brought suit for breach of contract46 the buyer demurred to
the complaint on the grounds that Pennsylvania's adoption of section
2-201(3)(c) prohibited enforcement of the agreement.47
The district court sustained the demurrer. In the view of the
court, the $100 down payment on the alleged purchase did not bring
the defendant within the part payment rule because the court could not
apportion the part payment to any commercial unit since the $100 was
less than the cost of one vat. Without extended discussion, Judge
Fortney concluded that the Uniform Commercial Code had made an
important change in the former part payment rule of the Uniform Sales
43. Williamson v. Martz, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 33 (C.P. Northumberland County
1956).
44. Starr v. Freeport Dodge, Inc., 54 Misc. 2d 271, 282 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Dist. Ct.
1967).
Professor Anderson discusses the alternative theories of the Pennsylvania court
and the New York court in his work on the law of sales and arrives at the conclusion
that "[wihen a payment is demonstrably the payment of part of the purchase price"
for an indivisible unit, this is ample evidence that a real transaction exists. He con-
cludes that the contract should be enforced. 1 R. ANDERSON, THE UNIFORM COMMER-
ciAL CODE 279 (2d ed. 1970).
45. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 33 (C.P. Northumberland County 1956).
46. Id. at 34.
47. Pennsylvania has adopted UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(3)(c)
without change, as has California. See PA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 2-201 (1970).
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Act, and this change precluded the enforcement of oral contracts when
the payment equals less than the price of an indivisible object. 48
New York's Liberal Approach
In Starr v. Freeport Dodge, Inc.41 the New York district court rea-
soned that since the code section does not deal with part payment for
an indivisible item, other principles of law should be relied upon in de-
ciding what effect to give a part payment. Starr involved a breach of
contract action arising from an oral agreement between the plaintiff
and the defendant car dealership for the purchase of an automobile.
The buyer had tendered a $25 down payment when the sale was con-
summated.5" On the day set for delivery of the automobile, the dealer
informed the buyer that an error had been made in computing the pur-
chase price and that it would be necessary for the plaintiff to pay an
additional $175.51 Plaintiff sued for breach of contract, and the deal-
ership demurred to the complaint, setting up the statute of frauds as a
defense. As had the defaulting party in Williamson, the defendant in
Starr urged that section 2-201(3)(c) 52 precluded enforcement of the
contract. 53
The court held that although the section was ambiguous when
applied to a part payment for an indivisible item, its language did not
exclude the enforcement of the automobile agreement based on the $25
down payment. 4 The court apparently did not feel bound by the lan-
guage of the section, nor did it rely on the New York law prior to the
48. Williamson v. Martz, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 33, 35 (C.P. Northumberland
County 1956).
49. 54 Misc. 2d 271, 282 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Dist. Ct. 1967).
50. In his complaint, the plaintiff buyer alleged that he had signed an order
form for the automobile which adequately described: (1) the subject matter of the
sale, (2) the price (which was in excess of $500), and (3) the identity of the buyer
and seller. However, the order form was not signed by the dealer or its agent and
thus could not be employed to enforce the contract under the statute of frauds.
Id. at 272, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 59 (Dist. Ct. 1967). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-
201(1) requires that a memorandum sufficient to enforce a contract for the sale of
goods with a price of $500 or more must be signed by the party against whom en-
forcement is sought. Hence the memorandum in Starr has no effect under the code's
statute of frauds.
51. 54 Misc. 2d at 272, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
52. The New York version of section 2-201(3)(c) is codified without change
in N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c) (McKinney 1964).
53. 54 Misc. 2d at 272, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
54. Hawkland argues that while the Pennsylvania approach follows the plain
meaning of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(3)(c), the payment of part of
the agreed price for one commercial unit provides ample evidence of the existence of
a contract for at least one commercial unit, though not necessarily for more than
one. I HAWKLAND, supra note 22, at 27-29.
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enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead, its decision cen-
tered on the proposition that the statute of frauds, if allowed as a de-
fense in the action at bar, worked an unconscionable result and en-
couraged rather than discouraged fraud.55 The court in Starr con-
cluded that it would be unconscionable to allow the dealership to use
section 2-201(3)(c) as a defense in this action, since the $25 part
payment provided ample evidence of the existence of a contract for the
sale of the one indivisible automobile.56 The court rejected the reason-
ing of the Pennsylvania court in Williamson, and overruled the de-
murrer.
57
Analysis of the Courts' Reasoning: Three Views
The courts in Lockwood, Starr, and Williamson all recognized that
section 2-201(3)(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code does not deal
with the enforceability of an oral agreement for a single, indivisible com-
mercial unit based on a part payment. All three courts employed dif-
ferent reasoning in ruling on the respective demurrers.
The facts in Lockwood and Starr were essentially the same-
buyer and seller entered into oral agreements for the sale of a single
automobile, and the buyer tendered part payment which was accepted
by the seller. In both cases, the seller repudiated the oral agreement.
Yet the courts decided the cases on entirely different grounds. Lock-
wood was decided on reliance on former statutes; Starr was decided
solely on a "conscionability" argument.
Judge Tomson, writing for the court in Starr, discussed the
Pennsylvania holding in Williamson and declared that the language
of section 2-201(3)(c) did not require the result in Williamson.5"
Referring to a strong criticism of Williamson which had pointed out that
the Pennsylvania theory "appears to be excessively restrictive,"5 9 the
court did not feel bound by the language of the section, or the New
York law prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code.
55. 54 Misc. 2d at 274, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
56. Id.
57. "To paraphrase Hawkland-It is difficult (here) to see how the contract
could have contemplated less than one (automobile), assuming, as the court did, that
(automobiles) are indivisible. Any other conclusion would work an unconscionable
result and would encourage rather than discourage fraud if the facts as pleaded ...
were proven at a trial." Id. at 274, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
58. Id.
59. Professor Hawkland, in his discussion of the Williamson case, notes that a
court can safely enforce a contract for a single unit based on a part payment, since
it is difficult to see how a contract could have been contemplated for less than one
unit when the parties entered into a contract and a part payment was tendered and
accepted. See HAwKLAND, supra note 22, at 27-29.
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The court took judicial notice of the practice of "low balling"6 in the
automobile industry-writing sales contracts but failing to have the
dealer's salesman sign the contract. The court noted that under this
practice, if the car dealer later decides to avoid the sales agreement for
some reason, the statute of frauds could be utilized as a defense when
the buyer brings suit for breach of contract.6 1 The court found that
this practice was encouraged by the construction of the statute in Wil-
liamson, and noted that the statute of frauds, if deemed a valid defense
in this action, would operate unfairly against the innocent buyer who
thought he had a contract and had parted with a portion of the pur-
chase price. The decision in Starr is thus based on the proposition that
the $25 down payment provided sufficient evidence to enforce the con-
tract since it would be "unconscionable"' 2 to allow the dealership to
use section 2-201(3)(c) as a defense in such a transaction.
On the other hand, the rule enunciated in the Lockwood decision
is based on different reasoning. The Lockwood rule is that a part
payment for an indivisible commercial unit validates an oral contract
under section 2201 where there is no quantity dispute.6" If the buyer
claims to have purchased no more than one unit, the part payment
provides ample basis for believing that a real contract exists between
the parties.6 The court in Lockwood pointed out that the part pay-
ment rule of section 2201 does not provide a solution to this statute of
frauds problem, because the provision was drafted to provide a formula
for enforcing oral contracts where there is a quantity dispute.6 5 There-
fore, since Commercial Code section 2201 did not provide a solution,
the court held that the former California rule should apply.6
The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code's statute of frauds
for the sale of goods overhauled the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act
to establish more practical rules to deal with enforcement of contracts
involving inadequate written documentation.67 Similarly, the legisla-
60. 54 Misc. 2d at 274, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See text accompanying notes 27-42.
64. See note 59 supra.
65. The legislative history noted that section 2-201(3)(c) is similar to prior
California law except that receipt of part payment formerly validated the contract in
its entirety, and now the contract is only validated "with respect to goods for which
payment has been made and accepted .... ." The rule was modified to set up more
practical rules to deal with part payment situations. See Sixth Progress Report to the
Legislature by the Senate Fact Finding Committee on Judiciary (1959-1961), Analysis
and Interim Report of the State Bar of California, Part I, the Uniform Commercial
Code 316, in I APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL or THE SENATE (1961).
66. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
67. See generally Project, supra note 7. See also Lattin, Uniform Commercial
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tive history indicates that the purpose of the statute of frauds contained
in the California Commercial Code was to require some basis for be-
lieving that a real contract existed between the parties.6" The part
payment rule of section 2-201(3)(c) recites that part payment is suf-
ficient to satisfy this policy "with respect to goods for which payment
has been made and accepted ....
The court in Lockwood construed this language as a method of
avoiding disputes over quantity terms of oral contracts. Where there
is no quantity dispute, the court in Lockwood held that the sales agree-
ment can safely be enforced for one unit based on the part payment.70
Hence, the court rejected the literal meaning of section 2-201(3)(c)
in the case of a single unit transaction and applied the former Cali-
fornia rule.71 Like the court in Starr, the court of appeal in Lockwood
rejected a literal reading of section 2-201(3)(c) because it felt that
the modem policy of the statute of frauds could best be served by en-
forcing an oral contract when there is an adequate basis for believing
the contract rests on a real transaction. The court in Lockwood, how-
ever, specifically pointed out that the former rule can apply only when
the alleged oral agreement is for a single unit-when there is no quan-
tity dispute.7
The Pennsylvania district court in Williamson was faced with a
different fact situation from Starr and Lockwood.73 The oral agree-
ment in this case involved the sale of two milk vats for $1600, for which
the buyer had tendered a $100 "payment on account" to the seller. In
addition, the buyer defaulted in Williamson, as opposed to the sellers
in Starr and Lockwood. In holding that section 2-201(3)(c) was
a valid defense in the breach of contract action, the court applied the
language of section 2-201(3)(c) to the facts at bar and concluded
that since the $100 payment did not equal the price of even one vat,
the entire contract was unenforceable. 74  The court concluded sum-
Code, Article 2 on Sales: Some Observations on Four Fundamentals, 16 HASTINGS
L.. 551, 571-72 (1965).
68. Report of Professors Marsh and Warren, reprinted in Sixth Progress Report
to the Legislature by the Senate Fact Finding Committee on Judiciary (1959-1961),
Analysis and Interim Report of the State Bar of California, Part 1, the Uniform
Commercial Code 436, 448-49, in 1 APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL Or THE SENATE (1961).
69. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(3)(c).
70. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 803-04, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
71. Professors Anderson and Hawkland have criticized the literal reading of Uni-
form Commercial Code section 2-201(3) (c) that the Pennsylvania court in William-
son v. Martz employed. ANDERSON, supra note 44, at 279; HAWKLAND, supra note 22,
at 29.
72. See 18 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
73. See text accompanying notes 45-48 supra.
74. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 33, 35-36 (C.P. Northumberland County 1956).
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marily that section 2-201(3)(c) made an important change by deny-
ing enforcement of a contract for a single object where the payment
made is less than the full amount.75  The Williamson court did not
cite any authority for its holding, and the decision seems to rest squarely
on the proposal that because part payment for an indivisble item is not
covered by the code section, such a contract cannot be validated by
part payment. The language of the court indicates that the agreement
in Williamson would not have been enforced even if there had been a
part payment under an agreement involving only one milk vat. This
reasoning is rejected by the courts in Starr and Lockwood, which found
that part payment evidenced the existence of a contract sufficiently to
validate it for one commercial unit.
Comment 2 to Uniform Commercial Code section 2-201 lends
support to the California and New York courts' rejection of the literal
reading of the section in Williamson. The following rule is set forth
for the guidance of the courts:
Receipt and acceptance . . . of the price constitutes an un-
ambiguous overt admission by both parties that a contract actually
exists. If the court can make a just apportionment. . . the seller
can be forced to deliver an apportionable part of the goods.76
The Lockwood court read these comments as establishing a requirement
that oral contracts not be enforced by the courts beyond a quantity
term to which part payment can be apportioned.77 Since the buyers in
Lockwood and Starr only claimed to have contracted for the purchase
of one commercial unit, and the defendant did not dispute that conten-
tion, the courts found that the contracts could safely be enforced. The
possibility that other terms of the bargain may be disputed was not
grounds for nonenforcement; parol evidence is admissible to establish
other terms of the oral agreement. 78 Since the legislature adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code's part payment rule to avoid quantity dis-
putes, and there was no quantity dispute in the Lockwood and Starr
fact situation, the courts properly validated the oral agreements with-
out violating the wording of the section, 79 or the contemporary policy
behind the statute of frauds.8"
The courts in Williamson, Starr, and Lockwood could have con-
75. Id. at 35.
76. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 2.
77. See 18 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
78. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202.
79. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201.
80. "The theory of the Official Text [UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201]
is that the Statute of Frauds intends only to prevent the enforcement of contracts not
in fact made. It does not seek to prevent their enforcement just because they were
oral." A Special Report by the California State Bar Committee, supra note 2, at 141.
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sidered other general provisions of the code when they were faced with
construing an ambiguous or seemingly incomplete section. Section
1-102, for example, provides in part:
(1) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act are:
(a) To simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing com-
mercial transactions;
(b) To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties ...
The liberal construction theory of section 1-10281 supports the deci-
sion of the court in Lockwood. The modem policy behind the statute
of frauds, as noted above, is to eliminate certain formal requirements
of prior laws, adherence to which often resulted in injustice rather than
the prevention of fraud. The* formal requirement of section 2-201
(3)(c) is designed to eliminate quantity disputes in multiple unit trans-
actions;82 since in Lockwood and Starr there was no quantity dispute,
the courts properly applied the former common law part payment
rule.8 3
Lockwood's Precedential Value
The fact situation in Williamson indicates that future courts may
have difficulty applying the Lockwood rule in certain indivisible con-
tract situations. The premise of the court was that reliance on the
former statute of frauds part payment rule was justified because the case
involved no quantity dispute.8 4  The Lockwood rule presents a prob-
lem for future consideration when a case arises where there is a quan-
tity dispute. Suppose in that case the buyer sued the defaulting seller
and when the seller answered the complaint, he claimed that the oral
agreement had not been for one automobile but for two. However false
the quantity claim might be, the parties have created a quantity dis-
81. UNIFORM Co~mMRCIIAL CODE § 1-102, Comment 1, discusses the purpose
of the section more completely: "[Tihis section indicates the continued applicability to
commercial contracts of all supplemental bodies of law except insofar as they are
explicitly displaced by this Act.. .. "
82. See 18 Cal. App. 3d at 803-04, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291. The court cited
Corbin for the proposition that "[t]he purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent the
enforcement of alleged promises that never were made; it is not, and never has been,
to justify contractors in repudiating promises that were in fact made." Id. at 803,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 291. Even though Corbin spoke some twenty years ago, his theory
that the formalistic requirements of the statute of frauds at common law should be
relaxed influenced the drafters of the UCC, for he is often cited.
83. "The statutory policy which under the old law permitted the enforcement
of oral contracts upon proof of part payment is equally sound under the new code,
as applied to the sale of an indivisible unit." Id. at 804, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
84. See 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 33, 35 (C.P. Northumberland county 1956).
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pute by their pleadings. Lockwood's rule requiring that there be no
quantity dispute before the court can apply the rule that part payment
validates an oral contract would make it inapplicable here. 5 Since
the Uniform Commercial Code has established section 2-201(3)(c)
as the rule for the courts to follow when there is a quantity dispute, the
court would have to follow the section and hold the oral agreement un-
enforceable under these facts.
For example, if buyer and seller entered into an oral agreement
for the sale of five automobiles and the buyer tendered part payment
equal to one automobile, section 2-201(3)(c) directs that the oral
contract only be enforced for one automobile.8 6 This would be so de-
spite the fact that at the trial the buyer might be able to produce con-
vincing parol evidence that the oral contract was for five automobiles.
However inequitable this result may be, the section requires the court
to make this apportionment. Therefore, when the defaulting party
creates a quantity dispute and the part payment does not equal the
price of one unit, the courts must recognize the defense of the statute
of frauds under section 2-201(3)(c).
One further problem might arise in the application of the Lock-
wood rule. In Williamson it is unclear whether the two vats in ques-
tion, priced at $800 each, were an indivisible contract or a divisible
contract. If we assume that the two vats comprised an indivisible com-
mercial unit under the definition of Uniform Commercial Code section
2-105,87 will the courts enforce the contract? Because the price
was $800 each, the court can apportion a part payment of $800 or less
to one vat. Yet if the two vats are treated in commercial usage as a sin-
gle item of equipment, the intent of the parties is not carried out by
enforcing the contract for one of the two vats if the single vat has no
utility to the buyer.
The Lockwood decision is of no help in resolving the application
of section 2-201 (3) (c) to these facts. The language of the section
directs the court to enforce the contract for one vat under the Lock-
wood rule. Yet, the result derived from a literal reading of the code
is contrary to its admonition to the courts to make a "just apportion-
ment wherever possible." ss On the other hand, the part payment covers
85. See text accompanying notes 27-42 supra.
86. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 2, provides in part:
"If the court can make a just apportionment . . . the seller can be forced to deliver
an apportionable part of the goods."
87. Id. § 2-105 defines a "commercial unit" as a "single article (as a machine)
or a set of articles (as a suite of furniture or an assortment of sizes) or a quantity
(as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated in use or in the relevant market
as a single whole." No definition of divisible and indivisible contracts is contained
in the code.
88. See id. § 2-201, Comment 2.
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no part of the price of the second vat; therefore the contract cannot be
enforced beyond the first vat under a literal reading of the Code8 9
and under the Lockwood rule.
Conclusion
The Lockwood rule-that part payment for an indivisible contract
satisfies the statute of frauds under Uniform Commercial Code section
2-201 (3) (c) when there is no dispute as to quantity-is supportable
on both policy and statutory construction grounds. The decision re-
flects a sound application of the modem theory that the statute of
frauds should prevent the enforcement of alleged promises that never
were made but should not allow parties to commercial transactions to re-
pudiate otherwise valid oral agreements through sharp commercial prac-
tices. The Lockwood rule, however, is limited to single unit contracts
where no quantity dispute exists between the parties. Thus, the deci-
sion will not aid further litigation where the oral agreement sought to
be enforced involves a commercial unit that is divisible so as to allow
the court to apportion the part payment under the language of section
2-201(3)(c).
Wilkes R. Morgan*
89. Id.
* Member, Second Year Class
February 19721
